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Abstract1
Distinct model-free and model-based learning processes are thought to drive both typical and2
dysfunctional behaviors. Data from two-stage decision tasks have seemingly shown that human3
behavior is driven by both processes operating in parallel. However, in this study, we show that4
more detailed task instructions lead participants to make primarily model-based choices that show5
little, if any, model-free influence. We also demonstrate that behavior in the two-stage task may6
falsely appear to be driven by a combination of model-based/model-free learning if purely model-7
based agents form inaccurate models of the task because of misunderstandings. Furthermore, we8
found evidence that many participants do misunderstand the task in important ways. Overall,9
we argue that humans formulate a wide variety of learning models. Consequently, the simple10
dichotomy of model-free versus model-based learning is inadequate to explain behavior in the11
two-stage task and connections between reward learning, habit formation, and compulsivity.12
Introduction13
Investigating the interaction between habitual and goal-directed processes is essential to understand14
both normal and abnormal behavior [1, 2, 3]. Habits are thought to be learned via model-free learn-15
ing [4], a strategy that operates by strengthening or weakening associations between stimuli and16
actions, depending on whether the action is followed by a reward or not [5]. Conversely, another17
strategy known as model-based learning generates goal-directed behavior [4], and may even protect18
against habit formation [6]. In contrast to habits, model-based behavior selects actions by computing19
the current values of each action based on a model of the environment.20
Two-stage learning tasks (Figure 1A) have been used frequently to dissociate model-free and model-21
based influences on choice behavior [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 6, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24].22
Past studies employing the original form of two-stage task (Figure 1A) have always found that healthy23
adult human participants use a mixture of model-free and model-based learning (e.g. [7, 20, 21]).24
Moreover, most studies implementing modifications to the two-stage task that were designed to promote25
model-based over model-free learning [21, 22, 24] find a reduced, but still substantial influence of model-26
free learning on behavior. Overall, the consensus has been that the influence of model-free learning on27
behavior is ubiquitous and robust.28
Our current findings call into question just how ubiquitous model-free learning is. In an attempt29
to use a two-stage task to examine features of model-free learning, we found clear evidence that30
participants misunderstood the task [25]. For example, we observed negative eﬀects of reward that31
cannot be explained by model-free or model-based learning processes. Inspired by a version of the32
two-stage decision task that was adapted for use in both children and adults [20, 21], we created task33
instructions in the form of a story that included causes and eﬀects within a physical system for all task34
events (Figure 1B-D). This simple change to the task instructions eliminated the apparent evidence35
for model-free learning in our participants. We obtained the same results when replicating the exact36
features of the original two-stage task in every way apart from the instructions and how the task’s37
events were framed.38
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Figure 1: The stimuli used in the three versions of the two-stage task. Panels A-C show the stimuli used
for each state in three separate versions of the two-stage task. Panel D shows the stimuli representing
common and rare transitions in the spaceship and magic carpet versions of the task. A: The original,
abstract version of the task used by Daw et al. [7]. In each trial of the two-stage task, the participant
makes choices in two consecutive stages. In the first stage, the participant chooses one of two green
boxes, each of which contains a Tibetan character that identifies it. Depending on the chosen box,
the participant transitions with diﬀerent probabilities to a second-stage state, either the pink or the
blue state. One green box takes the participant to the pink state with 0.7 probability and to the blue
state with 0.3 probability, while the other takes the participant to the blue state with 0.7 probability
and to the pink state with 0.3 probability. At the second stage, the participant chooses again between
two boxes containing identifying Tibetan characters, which may be pink or blue depending on which
state they are in. The participant then receives a reward or not. Each pink or blue box has a diﬀerent
reward probability, which randomly changes during the course of the experiment. The reward and
transition properties remain the same in the versions of the two-stage task shown in B and C; only
the instructions and visual stimuli diﬀer. B: Spaceship version, which explains the task to participants
with a story about a space explorer flying on spaceships and searching for crystals on alien planets.
C: Magic carpet version, which explains the task to participants with a story about a musician flying
on magic carpets and playing the flute to genies, who live on mountains, inside magic lamps. D:
Depiction of common and rare transitions by the magic carpet and spaceship tasks. In the magic
carpet task, common transitions are represented by the magic carpet flying directly to a mountain,
and rare transitions are represented by the magic carpet being blown by the wind toward the opposite
mountain. In the spaceship task, common transitions are represented by the spaceship flying directly
to a planet, and rare transitions are represented by the spaceship’s path being blocked by an asteroid
cloud, which forces the spaceship to land on the other planet. The transitions were shown during each
trial in the spaceship task. In order to more closely parallel the original task, transition stimuli were
only shown during the initial practice trials for the magic carpet task.
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Based on these results, we wondered whether behavior labeled as partially model-free in previous39
studies could, in fact, be the result of participants performing model-based learning, but using incor-40
rect models of the task to do so. In other words, could misconceptions of the task structure cause41
participants to falsely appear as if they were influenced by model-free learning? To test this hypothesis,42
we developed simulations of purely model-based agents that used incorrect models of the two-stage43
task to make their choices. The results demonstrated that purely model-based learners can appear to44
be partially model-free if their models of the task are wrong. We also re-analyzed the openly avail-45
able human choice data from [21] to look for evidence of confusion or incorrect mental models in this46
large data set. Consistent with our own previous data [25], we found evidence that participants often47
misunderstood the original two-stage task’s features and acted on an incorrect model of the task1.48
Our overall findings show that truly hybrid model-free/model-based learners cannot be reliably49
distinguished from purely model-based learners that use the wrong model of the task. Critically, they50
also indicate that when the correct model of the world is easy to conceptualize and readily understood,51
human behavior is driven primarily by model-based learning.52
Results53
Model-based learning can be confused with model-free learning54
Model-based agents can be confused with model-free agents. The prevalence of such misidentification55
is in the existing literature is currently unknown, but we present a series of results indicating that it56
is high. False conclusions about model-free learning can happen when the model used by model-based57
agents breaks the assumptions that underlie the data analysis methods. We will show that purely58
model-based agents are misidentified as hybrid model-free/model-based agents in the two-stage task59
when the data are analyzed by either of the standard methods, logistic regression or reinforcement60
learning model fitting. We present two examples of incorrect task models that participants could61
potentially form. We do not suggest that these are the only or even the most probable ways that62
people may misunderstand the task. These incorrect task models are merely examples to demonstrate63
our point.64
To serve as a reference, we simulated purely model-based agents that use the correct model of the65
task based on the hybrid reinforcement learning model proposed by Daw et al. [7]. The hybrid rein-66
forcement learning model combines the model-free SARSA( ) algorithm with model-based learning and67
explains first-stage choices as a combination of both the model-free and model-based state-dependent68
action values, weighted by a model-based weight w (0  w  1). A model-based weight equal to 169
indicates a purely model-based strategy and, conversely, a model-based weight equal to 0 indicates a70
purely model-free strategy. The results discussed below were obtained by simulating purely model-71
based agents (w = 1). We also note that consistent with recent work by Sharar et al. [26] we found72
that even when agents have a w equal to exactly 1, used the correct model of the task structure,73
and performed 1000 simulated trials, the w parameters recovered by the hybrid reinforcement learning74
model were not always precisely 1 (see Fig. 2F). This is expected, because parameter recovery is noisy75
and w cannot be greater than 1, thus any error will be an underestimate of w.76
The two alternative, purely model-based learning algorithms we created for simulated agents to use77
are: the “unlucky symbol” algorithm and the “transition-dependent learning rates” (TDLR) algorithm.78
The full details of these algorithms and our simulations can be found in the Methods section. Briefly,79
the unlucky symbol algorithm adds to the purely model-based algorithm the mistaken belief that80
certain first-stage symbols decrease the reward probability of second-stage choices. We reasoned that81
it is possible that participants may believe that a certain symbol is lucky or unlucky after experiencing82
by chance a winning or losing streak after repeatedly choosing that symbol. Thus, when they plan83
their choices, they will take into account not only the transition probabilities associated to each symbol84
but also how they believe the symbol aﬀects the reward probabilities of second-stage choices. In the85
current example, we simulated agents that believe a certain first-stage symbol is unlucky and thus86
lowers the values of second-stage actions by 50%.87
1Note that we used these data simply because they were openly available and were from a relatively large sample
of people performing the two stage task after receiving, in our view, the best instructions among previously published
studies using the two-stage task. We do not expect confusion to be more prevalent in this data set than in any other past
work. However, our current results indicate that stringent comprehension checks and double checks should be applied
whenever a two-stage task is used.
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Figure 2: Stay probability and model-based weights for simulated agents. Top row: Idealized stay
probabilities of purely model-free (A), purely model-based (B), and hybrid (C) agents as a function of
the previous outcome and transition. Model-free and model-based learning predict diﬀerent behaviors
for agents performing the two-stage task. In the two-stage task, model-free learning simply predicts
that a first-stage action that resulted in a reward is more likely to be repeated in the next trial.
Conversely, model-based learning uses a model (i.e. knowledge or understanding) of the task’s structure
to determine the first-stage choice that will most likely result in a reward [7]. To this end, it considers
which second-stage stimulus it believes to be the best (i.e. most likely to yield a reward at the current
point in time). Then it selects the first-stage action that is most likely lead to the best second-stage
stimulus. Model-free and model-based learning thus generate diﬀerent predictions about the stay
probability, which is the probability that in the next trial the participant will repeat their previous
first-stage choice. Model-free agents exhibit a main eﬀect of reward, while model-based agents exhibit
a reward by transition interaction eﬀect, and hybrid agents exhibit both a main eﬀect of reward and a
reward by transition interaction eﬀect. To generate the hybrid data plotted in this figure, we used the
logistic regression coeﬃcient values for data from adult participants in a previous study [20]. Bottom
row: Purely model-based agents that use incorrect models of the two-stage task can look like hybrid
agents that use a combination of model-based and model-free learning. Panels D and E show the mean
stay probabilities for each type of model-based agent following the four combinations of transition type
(Common, Rare) and outcome (Rewarded, Unrewarded). F) The histograms show the fitted model-
based weight parameters (w) for simulated agents using the correct (blue), unlucky-symbol (orange),
and transition-dependent learning rates (TDLR) (green) models of the task. We simulated 1000 agents
of each type and each agent made 1000 choices in the original two-stage task. Model-based weights
for each agent were estimated by fitting the simulated choice data with the original hybrid model by
maximum likelihood estimation. Error bars for the simulated data are not shown because they are
very small due to the large number of data points.
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The TDLR algorithm is based on debriefing comments from participants in a pilot study, which88
suggested that they assign greater importance to outcomes observed after common (i.e. expected)89
relative to rare transitions. For example, one participant wrote in the debriefing questionnaire that90
they “imagined a redirection [to the rare second-stage state] with a successful [outcome] as a trap91
and did not go there again.” To formalize this idea, we conceived a simple model-based learning92
algorithm that had a higher learning rate after a common transition and a lower learning rate after93
a rare transition. Hence, the learning rates are transition-dependent. Note that although we created94
this model based on participants’ feedback, we are not suggesting it is a model that many or even95
one participant actually used. We suspect that participants each use a slightly diﬀerent model and96
probably even change their mental models of the task over time. In reality, we don’t know if and how a97
given participant misunderstands the task. The TDLR and unlucky symbol algorithms are simply two98
plausible ‘proof of principle‘ examples to demonstrate our point. We simulated 1, 000 agents of all three99
purely model-based types (Correct, Unlucky symbol, and TDLR) performing a 1, 000-trial two-stage100
task. Again, the purpose of these simulations is not to show that real human participants may be101
employing these specific models when performing a two-stage task. Rather, the proposed algorithms102
are examples intended to illustrate that when agents do not employ the assumed task model, they may103
generate patterns of behavior that are mistaken for a model-free influence.104
The resulting data were first analyzed by logistic regression of consecutive trial pairs (Figure 2).105
In a logistic regression analysis of consecutive trial pairs, the stay probability (i.e. probability of106
repeating the same action) is a function of two variables: reward, indicating whether the previous trial107
was rewarded or not, and transition, indicating whether the previous trial’s transition was common or108
rare. Model-free learning generates a main eﬀect of reward (Figure 2A), while model-based learning109
generates a reward by transition interaction (Figure 2B) [7] (although this may not be true for all110
modifications to the two-stage task [27]). The core finding in most studies that have employed this111
task is that healthy adult participants behave like hybrid model-free/model-based agents (Figure 2C).112
Specifically, in the case of a logistic regression analysis on consecutive trial pairs, the results exhibit113
both a main eﬀect of reward and a reward by transition interaction. Our simulations show that TDLR114
and unlucky symbol agents, despite being purely model-based, display the same behavioral pattern as115
healthy adult participants and simulated hybrid agents (Figure 2D and E).116
We then analyzed the simulated choice data by fitting them with a hybrid model-based/model-free117
learning algorithm based on the correct model of the task (i.e. the standard analysis procedure).118
The resulting distributions of the estimated model-based weights are shown in Figure 2. The median119
model-based weight estimated for agents using the correct task model was 0.94, and 95% of the agents120
had an estimated w between 0.74 and 1.00. The estimated w for agents using the other algorithms121
were, however, significantly lower. The set of model-based agents using the unlucky-symbol algorithm122
had a median w = 0.36, and 95% of the agents had an estimated w between 0.24 and 0.48. The set123
of agents using the TDLR algorithm had a median w = 0.80, and 95% of the agents had an estimated124
weight between 0.70 and 0.90. Thus, these results demonstrate that analyzing two-stage task choices125
using a hybrid reinforcement learning algorithm can lead to the misclassification of purely model-based126
agents as hybrid agents if the agents don’t fully understand the task and create an incorrect mental127
model of how it works.128
Human behavior deviates from the hybrid model’s assumptions129
In order to test if human behavior following typical task instructions violates assumptions inherent in130
the hybrid model, we re-analyzed the control condition data from a study of 206 participants performing131
the original two-stage task after receiving a common form of two-stage task instructions that were, in132
our view, as good or better than all other previous studies [21]. Henceforth, we refer to this as the133
common instructions data set. First, we note that poor overall hybrid model fits and greater decision134
noise/exploration were significantly associated with more apparent evidence of model-free behavior.135
When examining how the overall model fit relates to indications of model-free behavior, we found136
that maximum likelihood estimates of the model-based weight for each participant correlated with137
the log-likelihood of the hybrid model’s fit. Specifically, we observed a weak but significantly positive138
correlation between the model-based weight and the log-likelihood of the model fit (Spearman’s rho =139
0.19, P = 0.005). Similarly, we found that the soft-max inverse temperature parameters in both the140
first (Spearman’s rho = 0.24, P = 0.0006) and second-stage (Spearman’s rho = 0.19, P = 0.007) choice141
functions also correlated with model-based weights. These correlations indicate that more exploratory142
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decisions, or simply decisions that look noisier according to the hybrid model, are associated with more143
apparent model-free influence on behavior. This set of results suggests that participants with a lower144
model-based weight may not necessarily be acting in a more model-free way, but rather, may be acting145
in a way that deviates from the hybrid model assumptions.146
Indeed, the standard hybrid model cannot explain the fact that participants in this experiment be-147
haved diﬀerently when first-stage symbols were presented on diﬀerent sides of the screen in consecutive148
trials. Note that, in many implementations of the two-stage task, the symbols presented at each stage149
appear on randomly selected sides. However, the side of the screen a symbol appears on is irrelevant150
and only the symbol identity matters. Therefore, if participants understand the task and first-stage151
symbols switch sides between consecutive trials, this should not influence their choices. Nevertheless,152
Kool et al. anticipated that participants might present a tendency to repeat key presses at the first153
stage [21] and thus modified the standard hybrid model to add a response stickiness parameter. For154
comparison with participant data, we simulated hybrid agents with response stickiness that performed155
1000 trials of the two-stage task. We then divided consecutive trial pairs from the simulated and156
participant data sets into two subsets: (1) same sides, if the first-stage choices were presented on the157
same sides of the screen in both trials, and (2) diﬀerent sides, if the first-stage choices switched sides158
from one trial to the next. Each subset was separately analyzed using logistic regressions. The results159
are presented in Figure 3A and C. Both simulated agents and participants showed a larger intercept in160
the same sides subset compared to the diﬀerent sides one. In the simulated data, this eﬀect was caused161
by response stickiness. However, in contrast to simulated agents, the human participants also showed a162
larger reward coeﬃcient if the first-stage options remained on the same sides (mean 0.41, 95% highest163
density interval (HDI) [0.35, 0.47]) than if they switched sides (mean 0.14, 95% HDI [0.08, 0.19]) with164
the posterior probability that the reward coeﬃcient is larger in same-side than switched-side trials165
being greater than 0.9999.166
There are several potential explanations for these side-specific results. It could be that model-free167
learning is sensitive to stimulus locations and/or specific responses (i.e. pressing left or right) and168
does not generalize across trials if the stimuli and responses change. In other words, it is possible169
that model-free learning considers that each symbol has a diﬀerent value depending on where it is170
presented or on which key the participant has to press to select it. In this case, however, we would171
expect the reward eﬀect for the diﬀerent-sides subset to be zero. Another possibility is that when the172
sides switched, participants were more likely to make a mistake and press the wrong key, based on the173
previous rather than current trial configuration. To further investigate this later possibility, we fit these174
data with a hybrid model that included an extra parameter that quantified the probability of making a175
configuration mistake and pressing the wrong key when first-stage symbols switch sides (see subsection176
“Fitting of hybrid reinforcement learning models” for details). Note that this configuration mistake177
parameter is distinct from decision noise or randomness, because it quantifies response probabilities178
that are specific to cases where the first stage symbols have switched places from one trial to the179
next, and thus it only decreases eﬀect sizes in the diﬀerent-sides subset rather than in all subsets180
(Figure 3B). We found that the estimated median probability of making a configuration mistake when181
the symbols switched sides was 0.54. However, when looking at individual participants, distinct types182
of performance were readily apparent. Out of 206 participants, 111 had an estimated probability of183
making a configuration mistake lower than 0.1 (based on the median of their posterior distributions).184
In contrast, 51 participants had an estimated probability of making a configuration mistake higher185
than 0.9. These results suggest that while most participants rarely made configuration mistakes,186
approximately 25% of them made mistakes more than 9 out of 10 times when the symbols switched187
sides.188
Next, we compared the fits of the configuration mistake model and the standard hybrid model for189
each participant data using PSIS-LOO scores (an approximation to leave-one-out cross-validation; see190
Methods section for details). The goodness of fits for the two models were equivalent on average for191
the 111 low-configuration-mistake participants (mean score diﬀerence: 0.0, standard error: 0.1), As192
expected, the configuration mistake model fit better for the 51 high-configuration-mistake participants193
(mean score diﬀerence:  34.1, standard error: 6.2). However, it is possible that the high-configuration-194
mistake participants were not truly making mistakes. As shown in Figure 3B, configuration mistakes195
decrease all eﬀect sizes in the diﬀerent sides subset, including the reward by transition interaction196
eﬀect, but this was not observed in the common instructions data set. Rather, some participants may197
have instead misunderstood the task—for example, they may have believed that the left/right button198
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Figure 3: Simulated agents’ and real participants’ behavior can be influenced by irrelevant changes
in stimulus position. All four panels show behavior in the two-stage task on trials in which the
position of the first-stage stimuli remains the same (blue) across consecutive trials compared to trials
in which the first-stage stimuli are in diﬀerent (orange) positions from one trial to the next. The
coeﬃcients in these graphs are from a logistic regression analysis explaining stay probabilities on the
current trial as a function of Reward (rewarded outcome = 1, non-rewarded outcome = 0), Transition
(common transition = 1, rare transition = 0), and the interaction between Reward and Transition on
the previous trial. In contrast to the typical procedure used in previous studies, which treats all trials
as the same, we analyzed the data after dividing the trials into two categories based on whether or not
the positions of the first-stage stimuli were the same or diﬀerent across consecutive trials. A) Results
from a simulation of hybrid agents with response stickiness (N = 5000) performing 1000 trials of the
two-stage task. The median parameter values from the common instructions data set [21] were used in
these simulations. B) Results from a simulation of hybrid agents that occasionally made configuration
mistakes (N = 5000) performing 1000 trials of the two-stage task. The median parameter values from
the common instructions data set [21] and a 20% configuration mistake probability were used in these
simulations. Error bars are not shown for these simulated results because they are very small due
to the large number of data points. C) Results from a re-analysis of the common instructions data
set [21] ((N = 206). This study used story-like instructions, but did not explicitly explain why the
stimuli might be on diﬀerent sides of the screen from trial to trial. The Reward eﬀect significantly
changed between trial-type subsets in this data set. D) Results from the magic carpet task (N = 24),
which provided explicit information about why stimuli may change positions across trials and that
these changes were irrelevant for rewards and transitions within the task. There were no significant
diﬀerences in the regression coeﬃcients between the two subsets of trials on this task. Error bars in
panels C and D represent the 95% highest density intervals.
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Data set 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
Daw et al. 2011 0.29 0.39 0.59
Kool et al. 2016 0.00 0.24 0.68
Spaceship 0.61 0.78 0.91
Magic carpet 0.51 0.79 0.85
Table 1: Model-based weight estimates for four data sets: Daw et al. [7] (N = 17), Kool et al. [21]
(common instructions data set, N = 206), the spaceship data set (N = 21) and the magic carpet data
set (N = 24). For the Daw et al. [7] data set, the weight estimates were simply copied from the original
article. For the other data sets, we obtained the weight estimates by a maximum likelihood fit of the
hybrid reinforcement learning model to the data from each participant.
press was more important than stimulus identity. In any case, these results suggest that diﬀerent199
participants understood the two-stage task in diﬀerent ways and potentially used diﬀerent models of200
the task to make their choices. Moreover, the large diﬀerence in reward eﬀects between same-side and201
diﬀerent-side trials indicates that many participants misunderstood basic facts about the task.202
Improving the instructions of the two-stage task decreases the apparent203
influence of model-free learning on behavior204
We developed two modified versions of the two-stage task with the goal of clearly explaining all205
features of the task so participants would be more likely to use the correct model of the task if206
they were model-based. Specifically, we incorporated a detailed story into the task instructions and207
stimuli (Figure 1B-D). Previous work has already used stories to explain the two-stage task to human208
participants [20, 21], but those story-based instructions did not provide a reason for all of the events209
in the task (see Supplementary Materials for further discussion). We sought to ensure participants’210
understanding of the task and leave no room for speculation during the experiment. Therefore, we211
modified the first and second stage stimuli and embedded them within a story that provided a concrete212
reason for every potential event within the task. We also displayed additional instructions during the213
practice trials before participants started the task. These instructions explained the reason for each214
event to the participants again as it happened, in the form of helpful messages that participants could215
not skip. See the Methods section for descriptions of the magic carpet and spaceship versions of the216
two-stage task that we developed and links to code for running the tasks.217
Hybrid learning model fits indicate that behavior is primarily model-based behavior with218
comprehensive instructions219
We tested the impact of our instructions on the apparent levels of model-based and model-free influ-220
ences on behavior by fitting the data with the standard hybrid learning model. In order to facilitate221
comparison with previously reported studies, we fit the model to each participant using maximum222
likelihood estimation. The estimated model-based weights for the participants who performed the223
spaceship or the magic carpet task were substantially higher (see Table 1) than the estimated weights224
found in two previous studies [7, 21] that used less complete task instructions. We also fit the hybrid225
model to the data from our magic carpet and spaceship tasks as well as the common instructions226
data using a Bayesian hierarchical model. Our results indicate that the posterior probability that the227
average weights in the magic carpet and spaceship data sets are greater than the average weight in the228
common instructions data set is greater than 0.9999.229
Standard logistic regression analyses also indicate primarily model-based behavior in the230
Spaceship and Magic Carpet tasks231
We compared the logistic regression results from the common instructions sample [21], to the spaceship232
and the magic carpet tasks (Figures 3 and 4). First, we used the standard method combining all233
consecutive trial pairs together regardless of whether or not the stimuli changed sides across trials.234
Figure 4 shows that when all trials are combined together, the coeﬃcient of the reward by transition235
8
.CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
(which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder, who has granted bioRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity.
The copyright holder for this preprint. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/682922doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Jun. 27, 2019; 
Figure 4: Stay probabilities for three empirical data sets. A) The behavior of participants (N = 206)
after receiving common instructions [21] shows both a main eﬀect of reward and a reward by transition
interaction. In contrast, the choices of participants after receiving improved instructions in the new
B) spaceship (N = 21) and C) magic carpet (N = 24) tasks show a much more model-based pattern.
Error bars in panels A to C represent the 95% highest density intervals. D) This plot shows the
mean and 95% highest density intervals of all coeﬃcients in the hierarchical logistic regressions on
stay probabilities for all three data sets. These logistic regression coeﬃcients used to calculate the
stay probabilities shown in A-C. Note that the main eﬀect of reward in the spaceship task is actually
inconsistent with a model-free influence on behavior in that task (see Figure 5)
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interaction, which indicates model-based control, is 5.9 times larger in the magic carpet (95% HDI236
[4.5, 7.3]) and spaceship (95% HDI [4.7, 7.2]) tasks compared to the common instructions results [21].237
No side-specific eﬀects and fewer configuration mistakes with enhanced magic carpet238
instructions239
In contrast to the common instructions sample [21], participants who performed the magic carpet240
task and were given more comprehensive instructions did not show diﬀerences between same-side and241
diﬀerent-side trial sets in the influence of reward or reward by transition interactions (Fig. 3C). Again,242
trials were divided into same sides category if the first-stage choices were presented on the same sides of243
the screen in both trials, and diﬀerent sides category, if the first-stage choices switched sides from one244
trial to the next. Recall that we found that first-stage stimulus location significantly influenced behavior245
in the common instructions sample, with same-side trials showing a significantly larger reward eﬀect246
than diﬀerent-side trials (Fig. 3B). The more comprehensive instructions eliminated this diﬀerence247
between trial types, which are, in fact, equivalent under the correct model of the task.248
Accordingly, the more comprehensive instructions almost completely eliminated configuration mis-249
takes. We fit the configuration mistake model to the magic carpet data, and the results were that 23 of250
24 participants had a mistake probability smaller than 0.05 and the remaining participant had a 97%251
mistake probability. Thus, we conclude that the enhanced magic carpet instructions vastly increased252
the probability that participants would act correctly when equivalent choices switched sides compared253
to the common instructions sample [21].254
Spaceship task data reveal misleading evidence for model-free influence255
Although choices in both the magic carpet and spaceship tasks showed large reward by transition256
interaction eﬀects, there is a small, but significant main eﬀect of reward on choices in the spaceship257
task (lower right panel of Figure 4). This may at first suggest that our enhanced instructions decreased258
but did not eliminate the influence of model-free learning on these participants’ behavior. After all,259
learning based on the correct model of the task does not introduce a main eﬀect of reward on choices.260
We took advantage of specific properties of the spaceship task to investigate this reward eﬀect in greater261
detail. We found that it is misleading as evidence for model-free influence because it contradicts one262
of the basic properties of model-free learning.263
Within the spaceship task there are pairs of first-stage stimuli that indicate the same initial state,264
but do so by presenting diﬀerent information. In other words, the stimuli are diﬀerent, but the initial265
state is the same. These pairs are shown in Figure 5A. This feature of the spaceship task allows us to266
subdivide trials into four categories in order to examine the reward eﬀect as a function of both stimuli267
and required responses. We divided the spaceship trial pairs into four subsets based on the information268
that was announced on the flight board above the ticket machine in the current and previous trials.269
The information on the flight boards are the stimuli that determine which first-stage action will most270
probably lead to a given second-stage state (see Figure 5A). The four trial categories were: (1) same271
spaceship and planet, if the same flight, with the same spaceship and planet, was announced on the272
board in both trials, (2) same spaceship, if the announced flights in both trials had the same spaceship,273
but the spaceship was departing for diﬀerent planets on each trial, (3) same planet, if the announced274
flights in both trials had the same planet destination, but diﬀerent spaceships were scheduled to fly275
there, and (4) diﬀerent spaceship and planet, if the flight announced in the previous trial had a diﬀerent276
spaceship and planet destination than the flight announced in the current trial. We analyzed the data277
from each trial pair category using the standard logistic regression approach.278
If the reward eﬀect was driven by model free learning, then we would expect that it was positive279
only when the stimulus-response pairing is identical across trials (i.e. category (1), same spaceship and280
planet). Model-free learning is frequently assumed to be unable to generalize between distinct state281
representations [15, 16, 21]. Thus it should have no influence on choices in categories 2-4 (Figure 5B).282
The analysis results, however, are contrary to the expectation from a model-free driven reward eﬀect283
(Figure 5C). The observed reward eﬀect had a similar magnitude for all four categories: 0.12 (95% HDI284
[ 0.10, 0.32]) for the same spaceship and planet, 0.14 (95% HDI [ 0.03, 0.32]) for the same spaceship,285
0.14 (95% HDI [ 0.04, 0.33]) for the same planet, and 0.19 (95% HDI [0.02, 0.36]) for a diﬀerent286
spaceship and planet. The corresponding posterior probabilities that the reward eﬀect is greater than287
zero in each of the four categories are 87%, 94%, 93%, and 98%, respectively. Analyzing trials from288
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Figure 5: An example of a reward main eﬀect that cannot be driven by model-free learning. A)
The spaceship task contains the four possible flight announcements shown here. Each trial of the
spaceship task began with a flight announcement on an information board above a ticket machine.
The name of a spaceship was presented first for 2 seconds, then the name of the planet the spaceship
was scheduled to fly to appeared to the right of the spaceship’s name, which remained on the screen,
for another 2 seconds. There are four possible flight announcements, because there are two spaceships
(X and Y) and two planets (Red and Black). The participant must select a spaceship to fly on
based on the announced flight. Each announcement listed only one spaceship’s destination, but still
provided complete information about the intended destination of all spaceships. This is because there
is a constant rule governing the spaceships’ flights—they always depart at the same time and fly to
diﬀerent planets. Thus, if one spaceship is listed as flying to Planet Red, then the other ship will fly
to Planet Black and vice versa. This means that the two screens in the left rectangle of panel A are
equivalent and depict the same initial state. The two screens in the right rectangle of panel A are also
equivalent to one another. B) This plot shows the results for simulated hybrid agents (N = 5000)
performing 1000 trials of the spaceship task under the standard assumption that model-free learning
does not generalize between diﬀerent state representations (i.e. diﬀerent flight announcements). The
hybrid model parameters used for this simulation were the median parameters obtained by fitting the
hybrid model to the human spaceship data set by maximum likelihood estimation. The points on the
plot represent coeﬃcients from a logistic regression analysis on the simulated choices, with consecutive
trial pairs divided into four subsets: (1, blue) same planet and spaceship, (2, orange) same spaceship,
(3, green) same planet, and (4, red) diﬀerent planet and spaceship. This division was made with
regard to which flight is announced in current trial compared to the preceding trial. Error bars are
not shown because they are very small due to the large number of data points. C) Logistic regression
results for the human data from the spaceship task (N = 21), with consecutive trial pairs divided into
four subsets: (1, blue) same planet and spaceship, (2, orange) same spaceship, (3, green) same planet,
and (4, red) diﬀerent planet and spaceship. In contrast to the simulated hybrid agents, the small
reward eﬀect in human behavior does not diﬀer across changes in the initial state. Thus, the driving
factor behind this reward eﬀect is inconsistent with a standard model-free learning system. Error bars
represent the 95% highest density intervals.
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categories 2 and 3 together, which corresponded to trial pairs where a “stay” choice required that289
participants choose a diﬀerent response (spaceship), the posterior probability that the reward eﬀect is290
greater than zero is 98%. Thus, the reward eﬀect observed in the spaceship task choices is roughly291
equal in every trial category, including those where either the stimuli presented to participants or the292
response required to implement the same choice as before are diﬀerent between the two trials. Note293
that generalization between diﬀerent flight announcements implies knowledge about the task structure,294
because the flight announcements define the transitions between first- and second-stage states. This295
strongly suggests that the observed reward eﬀects are not model-free, but result instead from model-296
based behavior, except that the models participants use are not identical to the one assumed by the297
standard analyses. (See in the Supplementary Material further evidence of deviations from the correct298
model in the magic carpet and spaceship tasks.)299
Discussion300
We show that simple changes to the task instructions and practice trials led healthy adult humans to301
behave in a model-based manner during a commonly used two-stage decision task. This is in contrast302
to the majority of the literature on two-stage decision tasks, which suggest that decisions in these tasks303
are driven by a combination of model-based and model-free learning. However, we also show that if304
purely model-based agents use mental models that diﬀer from the true model, which they may well do if305
they misunderstood the task, then the analysis can falsely indicate an influence of model-free learning.306
In other words, agents that are purely model-based can be mistakenly classified as hybrid model-307
free/model-based learners if they do not fully understand the environment (i.e. task). Therefore, our308
work here, together with other recent reports on the limitations of hybrid model fits [28, 26], indicates309
the need to carefully reconsider aspects of both the empirical tools and theoretical assumptions that310
are currently pervasive in the study of reward learning and decision making.311
Behavior does not necessarily fall into the dichotomous modes of simple model-free and correct312
model-based learning assumed in the design and analysis of two-stage decision tasks [30, 31, 32, 33,313
34, 35, 36, 37]. Instead, agents can form and act on a multitude of strategies from which the simple314
win-stay, lose-switch model-free strategy and the correct model of the task are only two possibilities315
(Figure 6). It is known that this multidimensional strategy space includes more complex model-316
free algorithms that can mimic model-based actions in some cases [31, 33]. Here, we show that it also317
includes model-based strategies that can appear to be partially model-free because they are inconsistent318
with the actual state of the environment or task rules (i.e. they are incorrect models). This mimicry of319
behavioral patterns between the infinite variations of model-free and model-based algorithms an agent320
might employ adds considerable uncertainty to any attempt to classify reward learning strategies based321
on behavior in a two-stage choice task.322
Drawing the conclusion that behavior is a hybrid mix of two exemplar algorithms (e.g. simple323
model-free and correct model-based) is especially tenuous. In such a case, the observed pattern of324
choices does not match the predictions of either of the two algorithms. Arguably the most plausible325
reason that observed behavior does not match either of the two candidate algorithms is that participants326
are not using either of those algorithms. However, it is also possible that behavior does not strictly327
follow either algorithm because both reward learning algorithms are operating in parallel and jointly328
influence decisions. Indeed, to date, the most common conclusion has been that there is a joint influence329
of model-free and model-based learning in two-stage decision tasks. The popularity of this conclusion330
may stem from strong prior beliefs in the existence of dual systems for learning. Regardless of the331
reason for its popularity, this conclusion relies on the assumption that participants have an accurate332
mental model of the task that they could use to guide their behavior. We argue that this assumption333
of understanding may not hold in many cases.334
In line with the possibility that apparently hybrid behavior is, instead, driven by misconceptions of335
the task, we found drastic shifts toward (correct) model-based behavior in healthy adult humans when336
we made seemingly small changes to the task instructions. It comes as no surprise that people do not337
always understand and/or follow instructions well. However, the extent to which people apparently338
misconstrued how the original two-stage task works and the impact of these misunderstandings on339
our ability to make accurate inferences about reward learning was unexpected for us. In both our340
local samples and when re-analyzing open data shared by other groups, we found strong indications341
that people misunderstood and/or incorrectly modeled the two-stage task in important ways. Among342
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Figure 6: A simplified two-dimensional diagram representing the strategy space in the two-stage task.
The space of all strategies agents can employ to perform the two-stage task contains the model-free
(MF) and correct model-based (MB) strategies, as well as intermediate hybrid strategies on the line
between them. However, it also contains other purely model-based strategies, such as the transition-
dependent learning rates (TDLR) and unlucky symbol strategies, among countless others. If these
incorrect model-based strategies are projected onto the line segment between model-free and correct
model-based behavior, they will yield the false conclusion that the participants are using a hybrid
MF/MB strategy. This projection of behavior onto the one-dimensional space along the line between
MF and MB is essentially what the standard analyses of the two-stage task do. However, in reality, a
human participant who misunderstands the two-stage task may use any of the strategies that we depict
here in two dimensions only for simplicity. In reality, the potential strategies exist in a multidimensional
space. Importantly, if people misunderstand the task in diﬀerent ways, then they will use diﬀerent
incorrect models that correspond to their current understanding of the task. Moreover, people may
well change strategies over the course of the experiment (represented by the dashed arrows) if they
determine that their understanding of the task was wrong in some way. Indeed, there is evidence that
extensive training may lead participants to learn and utilize the correct model of the two-stage task
over time [29]. Unless we can ensure a complete understanding of the correct model-based strategy a
priori, the vast space of possible incorrect models, heterogeneity across participants, and potential for
participants to change models over time make accurate identification of a hybrid mixture of model-free
and model-based learning a daunting, if not impossible, task.
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these indications are the location eﬀects detected in the common instructions data set [21]. The343
participants in this data set were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk, but similar behavior has344
been recently reported by Shahar et al. for participants who performed the two-stage task in a345
laboratory [38]. Shahar et al. proposed that location eﬀects are due to model-free credit assignment to346
outcome-irrelevant task features, such as stimulus locations and specific key responses [38]. However,347
this proposal is inconsistent with the results of the magic carpet and spaceship tasks, which show a348
reduction in location eﬀects under our improved instructions. Moreover, the spaceship task’s results,349
if interpreted according to the model-free/model-based framework, would lead to the conclusion that350
model-free learning is not only insensitive to outcome-irrelevant features, but also able to generalize351
between distinct outcome-relevant features (i.e. flight announcements). Clearly, the eﬀects of symbol352
location and identity on behavior vary across tasks depending on the instruction. This fact argues353
against such eﬀects being model-free and suggests instead that they are likely due to model-based354
confusion about the relevance of diﬀerent task features. The reduction in location eﬀects in our355
tasks also argues against another alternative explanation that our instructions, rather than alleviating356
confusion, emphasized the task’s transition structure, and thus simply encouraged participants to be357
more model-based. While it remains possible that our instructions also emphasize and/or encourage358
model-based behavior, that is not the whole story. The nearly complete elimination of location eﬀects359
and side switching mistakes is direct evidence that our instructions for the spaceship and magic carpet360
tasks cleared up participants’ confusion and incorrect modeling of the task.361
As discussed above, our simulations of TDLR and unlucky symbol agents provide a concrete demon-362
stration that choices based on an incorrect model of the task can falsely indicate an influence of model-363
free learning. The main eﬀect of reward in our spaceship task is empirical evidence that healthy adult364
humans may indeed employ one such misleading incorrect model. Overall, behavior on the spaceship365
task was almost completely (correct) model-based. However, there was a small main eﬀect of reward366
when computing a logistic regression analysis on consecutive trials with both the same or diﬀerent367
initial states. The main eﬀect of reward is assumed to be evidence of model-free learning [7], but368
model-free learning is also assumed to be unable to generalize between distinct but equivalent state369
representations [15, 16, 21, 31]. If the small reward main eﬀect in the spaceship task was driven by370
model-free learning, then model-free learning would have to able to generalize not only between dis-371
tinct states but also between distinct actions. Therefore, the observed reward eﬀect was more likely372
generated by model-based learning acting on a model of the task that does not precisely match the373
true underlying task model instead of being a model-free learning eﬀect. We emphasize again that we374
don’t think the TDLR or unlucky symbol models are the exact models that participants used. They375
are simply two plausible examples from the infinite set of incorrect models participants could have376
formed and acted on. The fact that there is an unlimited set of incorrect models and that some models377
used by human participants seem to mimic a hybrid model-based plus model-free agent is the core378
obstacle to drawing accurate conclusions from behavior in the two-stage task.379
The critical issue is that participants’ use of incorrect mental models in the original two-stage380
task not only produces noisy behavior, but can lead to false indications of model-free behavior. As381
noted above, we have demonstrated that simulated choices from purely model-based agents acting382
on incorrect mental models of the task appear to be driven by a combination of model-based and383
model-free influences (i.e. hybrid) when the data are analyzed using any of the currently employed384
methods (logistic regressions, hybrid model fits). We also found that in human choice data there is385
a small, but significant association between the ability of the hybrid reinforcement learning model to386
explain a participant’s choice pattern (i.e. the log-likelihood of the model) and the value of the model-387
based weight parameter. Specifically, when the hybrid model doesn’t explain human choices well,388
and/or estimates that a participant’s choices are noisy it is biased toward indicating that there is more389
model-free influence on behavior. These findings are consistent with previous reports that a measure390
of understanding, the number of attempts required to pass a four-question comprehension quiz, is391
related to model-based weight parameters [6]. In that study, worse, or at least slower achievement of,392
understanding was associated with more model-free influence as well. Overall, the data show that in the393
absence of suﬃcient understanding of the task, which would allow an agent to use the correct mental394
model, the standard analysis methods for two-stage task choices overestimate model-free influences395
on behavior. However, we should not forget that despite the limitations in our ability to accurately396
measure its influence on two-stage task choices, humans and other animals may use model-free learning397
algorithms in some cases.398
14
.CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
(which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder, who has granted bioRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity.
The copyright holder for this preprint. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/682922doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Jun. 27, 2019; 
Model-free reinforcement learning can readily explain the results of many animal electrophysiology399
and human neuroimaging studies. In particular, a highly influential finding in neuroscience is that400
dopamine neurons respond to rewards in a manner consistent with signalling the reward prediction401
errors that are fundamental to temporal diﬀerence learning algorithms, a form of model-free reward402
learning [39, 40, 41]. However, in the studies showing this response, there was no higher-order struc-403
ture to the task—often, there was no instrumental task at all. Thus, it was not possible to use more404
complex or model-based learning algorithms in those cases. Conversely, when the task is more compli-405
cated, it has been found that the dopamine prediction error signal reflects knowledge of task structure406
and is therefore not a model-free signal (for example, [42, 43]). A recent optogenetic study showed407
that dopamine signals are both necessary and suﬃcient for model-based learning in rats [44], and408
consistent with this finding, neuroimaging studies in humans found that BOLD signals in striatal and409
prefrontal regions that receive strong dopaminergic innervation correlate with model-based prediction410
error signals [7, 45]. Moreover, although there is evidence that anatomically distinct striatal systems411
mediate goal-directed and habitual actions [46], to date there is no evidence for anatomically separate412
representations of model-free and model-based learning algorithms.413
Model-free learning algorithms are generally assumed to be the computational analogs of habits, but414
they are not necessarily the same thing [1]. Initial theoretical work proposed the model-based versus415
model-free distinction to formalize the dual-system distinction between goal-directed and habitual416
control [4]. However, model-free learning has never been empirically shown to equate with or even417
exclusively lead to habitual behavior. Indeed, it is generally assumed that goal-directed actions can418
be based on model-free learning too. Consider a participant who is purely goal-directed but does419
not understand how the state transitions work in a two-stage task. This participant may resort to420
employing a simple win-stay, lose-shift strategy, which is model-free, but his behavior will not be421
habitual.422
Apparently model-free participants behave in ways inconsistent with the habitual tendencies that423
model-free learning is supposed to index. A study by Konovalov and Krajbich [47] combined eye-424
tracking with two-stage task choices to examine fixation patterns as a function of estimated learning425
type. In addition to those authors’ primary conclusions, we think this work highlights inequalities426
between seemingly model-free behavior, and what one would expect from a habitual agent. Their427
analysis strategy divided participants into model-free and model-based learners, based on a median428
(w = 0.3) split of the model-based weight parameter estimated from the hybrid reward learning algo-429
rithm. They reported that when the first-stage symbols were presented, model-based learners tended430
to look at most once at each symbol, as if they had decided prior to trial onset which symbol they431
were going to choose. In contrast, learners classified as model-free tended to make more fixations432
back and forth between first-stage symbols, and their choices were more closely related to fixation433
duration than those of the model-based group. We interpret this pattern of fixation and choices as434
suggesting that model-free participants made goal-directed comparisons when the first-stage symbols435
were presented, rather than habitual responses. This is because similar patterns of back and forth head436
movements, presumably analogous to fixations, are seen when rats are initially learning to navigate437
a maze [48]. Furthermore, the rats’ head movements are accompanied hippocampal representations438
of reward locations in the direction the animal is facing. Such behavior is seen as evidence that the439
animals are deliberating over choices in a goal-directed fashion. Humans also make more fixations440
per trial as trial diﬃculty increases in goal-directed choice paradigms [49]. Notably, these patterns441
of head movements and hippocampal place cell signaling actually cease once animals have extensive442
training on the maze and act in an automated or habitual fashion at each decision point [48]. Thus,443
supposedly model-free human participants’ fixation patterns during the two-stage task suggest that444
they are acting in a goal-directed rather than a habit-like fashion.445
In contrast to habits, model-free behavior decreases with extensive training on the two-stage task.446
In general, the frequency and strength of habitual actions increase with experience in a given task or447
environment. However, Economides et al. showed that the estimated amount of model-free influence448
in human participants decreases over three days of training on the two-stage task [29]. They also449
found that, after two days of training, human behavior remains primarily model-based in the face of450
interference from a second task (the Stroop task) performed in parallel. Both of these results raise451
questions about the relative eﬀortfulness of model-based versus model-free learning in the two-stage452
task. After all, although it is apparently hard to explain, the transition model behind the two-stage453
task is rather easy to follow once it is understood. Rats also show primarily model-based behavior454
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after receiving extensive training on the two-stage task [23]. In fact, the rats showed little or no455
influence of model-free learning. Moreover, Miller et al. [23] also showed that inactivation of the dorsal456
hippocampus or orbitofrontal cortex impairs model-based planning, but does not increase the influence457
of model-free learning. Instead, any influence of model-free learning in the rats remained negligible. As458
a whole, these results are diﬃcult to reconcile with the idea of an ongoing competition or arbitration459
between model-based and model-free control over behavior.460
Humans have been reported to arbitrate between model-based and model-free strategies based on461
both their relative accuracy and eﬀort. We know from several lines of evidence that both humans462
and other animals are sensitive to and generally seek to minimize both physical and mental eﬀort if463
possible [50]. Model-based learning is often thought to require more eﬀort than model-free learning. A464
well-known aspect of the original two-stage task [7] is that model-based learning does not lead to greater465
accuracy or monetary payoﬀs compared to model-free learning [31, 21]. Thus, it has been hypothesized466
that an aversion to mental eﬀort coupled with lack of monetary benefits from model-based learning467
may lead participants to use a partially model-free strategy on the original two-stage task [31, 21].468
Previous studies have tested this hypothesis by modifying the original two-stage task so that model-469
based learning strategies do achieve significantly greater accuracy and more rewards [21, 22, 24]. They470
found that participants appeared more model-based behavior when it paid oﬀ to use a model-based471
strategy. The conclusion in those studies was that participants will employ model-based learning if it472
is advantageous in a cost-benefit analysis between eﬀort and money.473
Our results and those from studies with extensive training [51, 23] cannot be explained by cost-474
benefit or accuracy trade-oﬀs between model-free and model-based learning. The magic carpet and475
spaceship tasks led to almost completely model-based behavior, but had the same equivalency in476
terms of profit for model-based and model-free learning as in the original two-stage task [7]. The477
objective eﬀort in the magic carpet task was also equivalent to the original two-stage task. Although478
an interesting possibility that merits further study is that giving concrete causes for rare transitions479
also reduced the subjective eﬀort of forming or using the correct mental model of the task. Similarly,480
the profitability of model-based learning does not change with experience. If anything, more experience481
with the task should allow the agent to learn that the model-based strategy is no better than the model-482
free if both are being computed and evaluated in parallel for a long period of time. Therefore, these483
two sets of results cannot be explained by an increase in model-based accuracy and profits compared484
to model-free learning.485
Seemingly model-free behavior may be reduced in all three sets of experiments through better486
understanding of the task. Clearly, improved instructions and more experience can give participants a487
better understanding of the correct task model. Most, if not all, of the modified two-stage tasks also488
have the potential to facilitate understanding as well as making model-based learning more profitable.489
This is because in addition to generating higher profits, the diﬀerential payoﬀs also provide clearer490
feedback to participants about the correctness of their mental models. If both correct and incorrect491
models lead to the same average payoﬀs, participants may be slow to realize their models are incorrect.492
Conversely, if the correct model provides a clear payoﬀ advantage over other models, participants will493
be guided to quickly change their mental models through feedback from the task. Of course, increased494
understanding and changes in the cost-benefit ratio may jointly drive the increases in (correct) model-495
based behavior in modified two-stage tasks. Additional data are needed to carefully tease apart these496
two potential reasons for increased model-based behavior in many newer versions of the two-stage task.497
Two-stage tasks have also been used to test for links between compulsive behavior and model-free498
learning in healthy and clinical populations. Compulsive symptoms have been found to correlate with499
apparent model-free behavior in the two-stage task [6, 14, 52]. Given our current results, however,500
the conclusion that model-free learning and compulsive behaviors are linked should be drawn with501
caution. We have shown that it is not clear what exactly is being measured by the two-stage task in502
healthy young adult humans. The same questions should be extended to other populations, including503
those with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). In the case of OCD, is the two-stage task picking up504
alterations in how distinct habitual (indexed by model-free learning) and goal-directed (model-based505
learning) systems interact to control behavior? Or are diﬀerences in two-stage choices driven by the506
ability to understand a task, create and maintain accurate mental models of it, and use these models507
to make decisions? It is certainly possible that OCD patients and other individuals with sub-clinical508
compulsive symptoms do indeed use more model-free learning during the two-stage task. However, a509
plausible alternative explanation for the correlations with model-free indexes in the two-stage task is510
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that compulsive individuals form and continue to follow inaccurate models of the world. Patients with511
OCD have been found to be impaired in causal reasoning between actions and outcomes [53], deficits512
which would likely impair the ability to form accurate task models. In fact, individuals with OCD513
have been reported to be impaired in multiple measures of cognitive flexibility, but the fundamental514
reasons for these impairments remain unclear [54, 55]. Our current findings do not change the fact515
that behavior on the two-stage task is correlated with compulsive symptoms, but they do indicate a516
need to continue investigating the underlying cause for these correlations.517
Reward learning is one of the most central and widely studied processes in the neural and behavioral518
sciences. Given that learning and decision processes are key drivers of behavior, it is important519
for researchers to have and use tools that can ascertain their mechanistic properties, their potential520
neural substrates, and how their dysfunction might lead to various forms of sub-optimal behavior or521
psychopathology. The specification of algorithmic formulae for model-free versus model-based learning522
has advanced the study of reward learning in many important conceptual and practical ways. However,523
as Nathaniel Daw recently noted, “such clean dichotomies are bound to be oversimplified. In formalizing524
them, the [model-based]-versus-[model-free] distinction has also oﬀered a firmer foundation for what525
will ultimately be, in a way, its own undoing: getting beyond the binary” [30]. We believe that526
our current results are another strong indication that the time to move beyond oversimplified binary527
frameworks is now.528
Methods529
All the code used to perform the simulations, run the magic carpet and the spaceship tasks, and530
analyze the results, as well as the data obtained from human participants, are available at https:531
//github.com/carolfs/muddled_models532
Simulations of model-based agents533
The model-based agents described in the Results section were simulated and their decisions analyzed534
by reinforcement learning model fitting. 1 000 agents of each type (original hybrid, unlucky symbol,535
and transition-dependent learning rates) performed a two-stage task with 1 000 trials, and the raw536
data were used to plot the stay probabilities depending on the previous trial’s outcome and reward.537
The hybrid reinforcement learning model proposed by Daw et al. [7] was fitted to the data from each538
agent by maximum likelihood estimation. To this end, the optimization algorithm LBFGS, available539
in the PyStan library [56], was run 10 times with random seeds and for 5000 iterations to obtain the540
best set of model parameters for each agent. The three types of model-based agents we simulated are541
described below.542
The hybrid algorithm543
Daw et al. [7] proposed a hybrid reinforcement learning model, combining the model-free SARSA( )544
algorithm with model-based learning, to analyze the results of the two-stage task.545
Initially, at time t = 1, the model-free values QMF1 (s, a) of each action a that can be performed at546
each state s are set to zero. At the end of each trial t, the model-free values of the chosen actions are547
updated. For the chosen second-stage action a2 performed at second-stage state s2 (the pink or blue548
states in Fig. 1A), the model-free value is updated depending on the reward prediction error, defined549
as  2t = rt   QMFt (s2, a2), the diﬀerence between the chosen action’s current value and the received550
reward rt. The update is performed as551
QMFt+1(s2, a2) = Q
MF
t (s2, a2) + ↵2[rt  QMFt (s2, a2)], (1)
where ↵2 is the second-stage learning rate (0  ↵2  1). For the chosen first-stage action a1 performed552
at the first-stage state s1, the value is updated depending on the reward prediction error at the first553
and second stages, as follows:554
QMFt+1(s1, a1) = Q
MF
t (s1, a1) + ↵1[Q
MF
t (s2, a2) QMFt (s1, a1)] + ↵1 [rt  QMFt (s2, a2)], (2)
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where ↵1 is the first-stage learning rate (0  ↵1  1),  1t = QMFt (s2, a2)   QMFt (s1, a1) is the reward555
prediction error at the first stage, and   is the so-called eligibility parameter (0     1), which556
modulates the eﬀect of the second-stage reward prediction error on the values of first-stage actions.557
The model-based value QMBt (s2, a2) of each action a2 performed at second-stage state s2 is the558
same as the corresponding model-free value, i.e., QMBt (s2, a2) = QMFt (s2, a2). The model-based value559
of each first-stage action a1 is calculated at the time of decision making from the values of second-stage560
actions as follows:561
QMBt (s1, a1) =
X
s22S
P (s2|s1, a1) max
a22A
QMBt (s2, a2), (3)
where P (s2|s1, a1) is the probability of transitioning to second-stage state s2 by performing action a1562
at first-stage state s1, S = {pink , blue} is the set of second-stage states, and A is the set containing563
the actions available at that state.564
The agent makes first-stage choices based on both the model-free and the model-based state-action565
pairs, weighted by a model-based weight w (0  w  1), according to a soft-max distribution:566
Pt(s1, a1) =
e 1[wQ
MB
t (s1,a1)+(1 w)QMFt (s1,a1)+p·rept(a1)]P
a02A e 1[wQ
MB
t (s1,a
0)+(1 w)QMFt (s1,a0)+p·rept(a0)]
, (4)
where  1 is the first-stage’s inverse temperature parameter, which determines the exploration-exploitation567
trade-oﬀ at this stage, p is a perseveration parameter that models a propensity for repeating the pre-568
vious trial’s first-stage action in the next trial, and rept(a0) = 1 if the agent performed the first-stage569
action a0 in the previous trial, and zero otherwise. Kool et al. [21] have added an additional parameter570
to the hybrid model—the response stickiness ⇢—and the above equation becomes571
Pt(s1, a1) =
e 1[wQ
MB
t (s1,a1)+(1 w)QMFt (s1,a1)+p·rept(a1)+⇢·respt(a1)]P
a02A e 1[wQ
MB
t (s1,a
0)+(1 w)QMFt (s1,a0)+p·rept(a0)+⇢·respt(a0)]
, (5)
where the variable respt(a0) is equal to 1 if a0 is the first-stage action performed by pressing the same572
key as in the previous trial, and zero otherwise.573
Choices at the second stage are simpler, as the model-free and model-based values of second-stage574
actions are the same and there is no assumed tendency to repeat the previous action or key press.575
Second-stage choice probabilities are given as follows:576
Pt(s2, a2) =
e 2Qt(s2,a2)P
a02A e 2Qt(s2,a
0) . (6)
We propose two alternative algorithms below to demonstrate that model-based agents may be577
mistakenly classified as hybrid agents. These algorithms are based on the algorithm by Daw et al. [7]578
detailed above, except that the inverse temperature parameter is the same for both stages (for simplicity579
because these models are only intended as demonstrations), the perseveration parameter p is equal to580
0 (again, for simplicity), and the model-based weight w is equal to 1, indicating a purely model-based581
strategy.582
The unlucky-symbol algorithm583
We simulated an agent that believes a certain first-stage symbol is unlucky and lowers the values584
of second-stage actions by 50%. This model-based algorithm has three parameters: 0  ↵ 1, the585
learning rate,   > 0, an inverse temperature parameter for both stages (for simplicity), and 0 < ⌘ < 1,586
a reduction of second-stage action values caused by choosing the unlucky symbol. The value of each587
first-stage action a1 is calculated from the values of second-stage actions as follows:588
Qt(s1, a1) =
X
s22S
P (s2|s1, a1) max
a22A
Qt(s2, a2), (7)
The probability of choosing a first-stage action is given by:589
Pt(s1, a1) =
eunlucky(a1) Qt(s1,a1)P
a02A eunlucky(a
0) Qt(s1,a0)
, (8)
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where unlucky(a) = ⌘ if the agent thinks action a is unlucky and unlucky(a) = 1 otherwise. Second-590
stage value updates and second-stage choices are made as described above for the original hybrid591
model. The probability of choosing a second-stage action is given by592
Pt(s2, a2) =
eunlucky(a1) Q(s2,a2)P
a02A eunlucky(a1) Qt(s2,a2)
. (9)
Learning of second-stage action values occurs as in the original hybrid model.593
The transition-dependent learning rates (TDLR) algorithm594
This is a simple model-based learning algorithm that has a higher learning rate after a common595
transition and a lower learning rate after a rare transition; hence, the learning rates are transition-596
dependent. This model-based TDLR algorithm has three parameters: ↵c, the higher learning rate for597
outcomes observed after common transitions (0  ↵c  1), ↵r, the lower learning rate for outcomes598
observed after rare transitions (0  ↵r < ↵c), and   > 0, an inverse temperature parameter that599
determines the exploration-exploitation trade-oﬀ. In each trial t, based on the trial’s observed outcome600
(rt = 1 if the trial was rewarded, rt = 0 otherwise), the algorithm updates the estimated value601
Qt(s2, a2) of the chosen second-stage action a2 performed at second-stage state s2 (pink or blue). This602
update occurs according to the following equation:603
Qt+1(s2, a2) = Qt(s2, a2) + ↵[rt  Qt(s2, a2)], (10)
where ↵ = ↵c if the transition was common and ↵ = ↵r if the transition was rare. The value of each604
first-stage action a1 is calculated from the values of second-stage actions as follows:605
Qt(s1, a1) =
X
s22S
P (s2|s1, a1) max
a22A
Qt(s2, a2), (11)
where P (s2|s1, a1) is the probability of transitioning to second-stage state s2 by performing action a1606
at first-stage s1, S is the set of second-stage states, and A is the set of all second-stage actions. Choices607
made at first- or second-stage states are probabilistic with a soft-max distribution:608
Pt(s, a) =
e Qt(s,a)P
a02A e Qt(s,a
0) . (12)
When this model was fitted to human participant data, five parameters were used instead: ↵c,609
the learning rate for outcomes observed after common transitions, ↵r, the learning rate for outcomes610
observed after rare transitions,  1, the first-stage’s inverse temperature parameter,  2, the second-611
stage’s inverse temperature parameter, and p, the perseveration parameter.612
Simulation parameters613
We simulated 1 000 purely model-based agents performing the two-stage task using each of the al-614
gorithms described above: (1) the original hybrid algorithm using a model-based weight w = 1 and615
↵1 = ↵2 = 0.5, (2) the unlucky-symbol algorithm with ↵ = 0.5 and ⌘ = 0.5, and (3) the TDLR616
algorithm with ↵c = 0.8 and ↵r = 0.2. For all agents, the   parameters had a value of 5.617
Analysis of the common instructions data618
In [21], 206 participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk performed the two-stage task for 125619
trials. See [21] for further details. The behavioral data were downloaded from the first author’s Github620
repository (https://github.com/wkool/tradeoﬀs) and reanalyzed by logistic regression and reinforce-621
ment learning model fitting, as described below.622
Logistic regression of consecutive trials623
This analysis was applied to all the analyzed behavioral data sets. Consecutive trial pairs were divided624
into subsets, depending on the presentation of first-stage stimuli. The results for each subset were then625
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separately analyzed, using a hierarchical logistic regression model whose parameters were estimated626
through Bayesian computational methods. The predicted variable was pstay, the stay probability for627
a given trial, and the predictors were xr, which indicated whether a reward was received or not in628
the previous trial (+1 if the previous trial was rewarded,  1 otherwise), xt, which indicated whether629
the transition in the previous trial was common or rare (+1 if it was common,  1 if it was rare), the630
interaction between the two. Thus, for each condition, an intercept  0 for each participant and three631
fixed coeﬃcients were determined, as shown in the following equation:632
pstay =
1
1 + exp[ ( 0 +  rxr +  txt +  r⇥txrxt)] . (13)
The distribution of y was Bernoulli(pstay). The distribution of the ~  vectors was N (~µ, ~ 2). The pa-633
rameters of the ~  distribution were given vague prior distributions based on preliminary analyses—the634
~µ vectors’ components were given a N (µ = 0, 2 = 25) prior, and the ~ 2 vector’s components were635
given a Cauchy(0, 1) prior. Other vague prior distributions for the model parameters were tested and636
the results did not change significantly.637
To obtain parameter estimates from the model’s posterior distribution, we coded the model into638
the Stan modeling language [57, 58] and used the PyStan Python package [56] to obtain 60 000 samples639
of the joint posterior distribution from four chains of length 30 000 (warmup 15 000). Convergence of640
the chains was indicated by Rˆ ⇡ 1.0 for all parameters.641
Fitting of hybrid reinforcement learning models642
The hybrid reinforcement learning model proposed by Daw et al. [7] was fitted to all data sets (common643
instructions, magic carpet, and spaceship). To that end, we used a Bayesian hierarchical model, which644
allowed us to pool data from all participants to improve individual parameter estimates. For the645
analysis of the spaceship data, four distinct first-stage states were assumed, corresponding to the four646
possible flight announcements (Figure 5A).647
The parameters of the hybrid model for the ith participant were ↵i1, ↵i2,  i,  i1,  i2, wi, and648
pi. Vectors (logit(↵i1), logit(↵i2), logit( i), log( i1), log( i2), logit(wi), pi), obtained for each participant,649
were given a multivariate normal distribution with mean µ and covariance matrix ⌃. These transfor-650
mation of the parameters were used because the original values were constrained to an interval and651
the transformed ones were not, which the normal distribution requires. The model’s hyperparameters652
were given weakly informative prior distributions. Each component of µ was given a normal prior653
distribution with mean 0 and variance 5, and ⌃ was decomposed into a diagonal matrix ⌧ , whose654
diagonal components were given a Cauchy prior distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, and a cor-655
relation matrix ⌦, which was given an LKJ prior [59] with shape ⌫ = 2 [58]. This model was coded656
in the Stan modelling language [58, 57] and fitted to each data set using the PyStan interface [56] to657
obtain a chain of 40 000 iterations (warmup: 20 000) for the common instructions data set and 80 000658
iterations (warmup: 40 000) for the magic carpet and spaceship data sets. Convergence was indicated659
by Rˆ  1.1 for all parameters.660
The same procedure above was performed to fit a hybrid model with a mistake probability to the661
common instructions and magic carpet data sets. An additional parameter was added to the original662
hybrid reinforcement learning model: ⇢i, the probability of making a mistake and making the wrong663
choice when the first-stage symbols switched sides from one trial to the next. Precisely, in trials664
with the first-stage symbols on diﬀerent sides compared with the previous trials, let Pht (s1, a1) be the665
probability, according to the standard hybrid model, that the participant selected action a1 at the666
first-stage si in trial t. The same probability according the hybrid model with a mistake probability667
was given by668
Pt(s1, a1) = (1  ⇢)Pht (s1, a1) + ⇢(1  Pht (s1, a1)). (14)
This model also assumes that the participant realized their mistake after making one and that action669
values were updated correctly. Data from each participant were described by a vector (logit(↵i1), logit(↵i2), logit( i), log( i1), log( i2), logit(wi), pi, logit(⇢i)).670
The computed log-likelihoods obtained for each participant and model at each iteration were used671
to calculate the PSIS-LOO score (an approximation of leave-one-out cross-validation) of each model for672
each participant. To this end, the loo and compare functions of the loo R package were employed [60].673
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The standard hybrid model was fit to all data sets by maximum likelihood estimation. The model674
was coded in the Stan modelling language [58, 57] and fitted 1000 times (for robustness) to each675
participant’s choices using LBFGS algorithm implemented by Stan through the PyStan interface [56].676
The magic carpet and spaceship tasks677
24 healthy participants participated in the magic carpet experiment and 21 in the spaceship experiment.678
In both cases, participants were recruited from the University of Zurich’s Registration Center for Study679
Participants. The inclusion criterion was speaking English, and no participants were excluded from680
the analysis. The sample sizes were based on our previous pilot studies using the two-stage task [25].681
The experiment was conducted in accordance with the Zurich Cantonal Ethics Commission’s norms682
for conducting research with human participants, and all participants gave written informed consent.683
Participants first read the instructions for the practice trials and completed a short quiz on these684
instructions. For the magic carpet and spaceship tasks, 50 and 20 practice trials were performed685
respectively. Next, participants read the instructions for the main task, which was then performed.686
For the magic carpet task, they performed 201 trials and for the spaceship task, 250 trials. This687
number of trials excludes slow trials. Trials were divided into three blocks of roughly equal length.688
For every rewarded trial in the magic carpet or spaceship task, participants were paid CHF 0.37 or689
CHF 0.29 respectively. The total payment was displayed on the screen and the participants were asked690
to fill in a short questionnaire. For the magic carpet task, the questionnaire contained the following691
questions:692
1. For each first-stage symbol, “What was the meaning of the symbol below?”693
2. “How diﬃcult was the game?” with possible responses being “very easy,” “easy,” “average,”694
“diﬃcult,” and “very diﬃcult.”695
3. “Please describe in detail the strategy you used to make your choices.”696
For the spaceship task, participants were only asked about their strategy. The questionnaire data are697
available in our Github repository along with all the code and the remaining participant data.698
Magic carpet task description699
Our magic carpet version of the two-stage task was framed as follows. Participants were told that they700
would be playing the role of a musician living in a fantasy land. The musician played the flute for gold701
coins to an audience of genies, who lived inside magic lamps on Pink Mountain and Blue Mountain.702
Two genies lived on each mountain. Participants were told that the symbol written on each genie’s703
lamp (a Tibetan character, see Figure 1C) was the genie’s name in the local language. When the704
participants were on a mountain, they could pick up a lamp and rub it. If the genie was in the mood705
for music, he would come out of his lamp, listen to a song, and give the musician a gold coin. Each706
genie’s interest in music could change with time. The participants were told that the lamps on each707
mountain might switch sides between visits to a mountain, because every time they picked up a lamp708
to rub it, they might put it down later in a diﬀerent place.709
To go to the mountains, the participant chose one of two magic carpets (Figure 1C). They had710
purchased the carpets from a magician, who enchanted each of them to fly to a diﬀerent mountain.711
The symbols (Tibetan characters) written on the carpets meant “Blue Mountain” and “Pink Mountain”712
in the local language. A carpet would generally fly to the mountain whose name was written on it, but713
on rare occasions a strong wind blowing from that mountain would make flying there too dangerous714
because the wind might blow the musician oﬀ the carpet. In this case, the carpet would be forced to715
land instead on the other mountain. The participants were also told that the carpets might switch716
sides from one trial to the next, because as they took their two carpets out of the cupboard, they might717
put them down and unroll them in diﬀerent sides of the room. The participants first did 50 “tutorial718
flights,” during which they were told the meaning of each symbol on the carpets, i.e., they knew which719
transition was common and which was rare. Also, during the tutorial flights, the participants saw a720
transition screen (Figure 1D), which showed the carpet heading straight toward a mountain (common721
transition) or being blown by the wind in the direction of the other mountain (rare transition). During722
the task, however, they were told their magic carpets had been upgraded to be entirely self-driving.723
Rather then drive the carpet, the musician would instead take a nap aboard it and would only wake724
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up when the carpet arrived on a mountain. During this period a black screen was displayed. Thus,725
participants would have to figure out the meaning of each symbol on the carpets for themselves. The726
screens and the time intervals were designed to match the original abstract task [7], except for the727
black “nap” screen displayed during the transition, which added one extra second to every trial.728
Spaceship task description729
We also designed a second task, which we call the spaceship task, that diﬀered from the original task730
reported in Daw et al. [7] in terms of how the first stage options were represented. Specifically, there731
were four configurations for the first-stage screen rather than two. These configurations were repre-732
sented as four diﬀerent flight announcements displayed on a spaceport information board (Figure 5A).733
The design of task was based on the common assumption that model-free learning is unable to gen-734
eralize between distinct state representations [15, 16, 21]. It has also been argued that reversals of735
the transition matrix should increase the eﬃcacy of model-based compared to model-free learning [31].736
This type of reversal could happen between each trial in the spaceship task depending on which flight737
was announced. Thus, there are two reasons to expect that participants completing the spaceship task738
may be more model-based compared to the magic carpet task.739
The spaceship task instructions stated that the participant would play the role of a space explorer740
searching for crystals on alien planets. These crystals possessed healing power and could be later sold741
in the intergalactic market for profit. The crystals can be found inside obelisks that were left on the742
surfaces of planets Red and Black by an ancient alien civilization. The obelisks grew crystals like743
oysters grow pearls, and the crystals grew at diﬀerent speeds depending on the radiation levels at the744
obelisk’s location. There were two obelisks on each planet, the left and the right obelisk, and they did745
not switch sides from trial to trial. To go to planet Red or Black, the participant would use the left or746
the right arrow key to buy a ticket on a ticket machine that would reserve them a seat on spaceship747
X or Y. The buttons to buy tickets on spaceships X and Y were always the same. A board above748
the ticket machine announced the next flight, for example, “Spaceship Y will fly to planet Black.”749
Participants were told that the two spaceships were always scheduled to fly to diﬀerent planets, that750
is, if spaceship Y was scheduled to fly to planet Black, that meant spaceship X was scheduled to fly to751
planet Red. Thus, if the announcement board displayed “Spaceship Y” and “Planet Black,” but they752
wanted to go to planet Red, they should book a seat on spaceship X.753
After buying the ticket, the participant observed the spaceship flying to its destination. The754
participant was able to see that the spaceship would usually reach the planet it was scheduled to fly755
to, but in about one flight out of three the spaceship’s path to the target planet would be blocked by756
an asteroid cloud that appeared unpredictably, and the spaceship would be forced to do an emergency757
landing on the other planet. The precise transition probabilities were 0.7 for the common transition and758
0.3 for the rare transition (Figure 1B). This transition screen was displayed during both the practice759
trials and the task trials (Figure 1D), and it explained to the participants why the spaceship would760
commonly land on the intended planet but in rare cases land on the other instead.761
Thus, other than the four flight announcements, the spaceship task diﬀered from the original two-762
stage task in that (1) the first-stage choices were labelled X and Y and were always displayed on the763
same sides, (2) for each choice, the participants were told which transition was common and which was764
rare, as well as the transition probabilities, (3) the participants saw a transition screen that showed765
if a trial’s transition was common or rare, (4) the second-stage options were identified by their fixed766
position (left or right), and (5) the time intervals for display of each screen were diﬀerent. Many of767
these changes should facilitate model-based learning by making the task easier to understand.768
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